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POLICE AND POLITICS 
LECTURE* WITH FOREWORD 
 






Foreword: Civilian control and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee0 
 
 
The international association established for the oversight of society on law-
enforcement agencies (International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law 
Enforcement - IACOLE) is a professional organization exclusively built up of 
members who are employees of organizations which were created by the legislative or 
executive powers to investigate and/or oversee complaints concerning law-
enforcement agencies. Members of law-enforcement agencies under oath may not 
become members of the association, and members of other Non-Governmental 
Organizations may only become associated members without the right of voting. 
 
Society considers - according to the information booklet of the association established 
in 1985- three institutions to be authorized to deal with complaints concerning the 
police - the attorney’s department, the court and the media. Yet the attorney’s 
department may, on one hand, only deal with those complaints in full detail, which 
relate to a crime, and on the other hand as an authority on indictment continually 
cooperates with the police, and thus will not willingly bring a charge against the 
police. The courts lack the necessary instruments for the oversight of the police, whilst 
the media is controlled by its own inner dynamics: legal offences committed by the 
police and the investigations tied to this will only hold the public’s interest for a short 
while. Finally, if a police authority conducts the investigation of a complaint, the 
trustworthiness of such an investigation will be doubtful in the eye of the public, from 
the outset. 
 
We might add the following to the American summary based upon the local legal 
system and practice: The attorney’s department oversees the investigations and 
oversees the observance of the regulations concerning the detained. With its dual 
authority it may observe minor violations, which are not considered to be crimes. Yet 
it is true in the case of Hungary as well that the attorney’s department as an 
organization must concentrate on the successfulness of the investigation and on the 
legality of the handling of the suspect. These interests conflict with each other all the 
time, and especially in the case of minor violations, the attorney’s department’s 
authority on indictment seems to be the stronger of the two. Based upon Hungarian 
law, with the exception of several cases of civil action, criminal prosecution may not 
                                                          
*
 The lecture was delivered on 8 September 1999 in Sydney. Because of the brevity of time I shortened 
the text and on the occasion of the current publishing I added several paragraphs on secret information 
gathering. Because of the foreign audience I stated several facts that are commonplace for the 
Hungarian readers. The COLPI and the Soros Foundation supported the participation at the conference. 
 
 2 
be initiated without the attorney’s proposal - this may be somewhat modified by 
supplemental civil action. 
 
The media is further constrained, besides decreasing public interest, by the fact that 
the police may feed information to the media in the way it sees fit. Although 
information of public interest does concern the public, the publishing of information 
may be refused at any time by the police, through a referral made to the law on secrets 
of the state or service, the interest of the investigation, or the protection of the 
personal rights of the police officers under complaint. 
 
To supplement the traditional exterior control of police activity a system was devised 
in the mid-eighties, primarily in Anglo-Saxon countries, which provided participation 
for the citizens in the observation of police activities and the investigation of 
complaints. According to the information booklet of the IACOLE, the civilian 
oversight was organized at the local-governmental level in the United States, belongs 
to the scope of operation of the governments of the federal states or the provinces in 
Australia and Canada, whilst in Great-Britain the government itself is responsible for 
the establishment of the organs of civilian oversight. 
 
In Hungary - as in numerous countries of Europe or South America - a function 
similar to the Anglo-Saxon civilian oversight is primarily upheld by the position of the 
ombudsman. In the Netherlands the ombudsman is virtually an authority of appeal. If 
the results of the investigation of a complaint, initiated by the mayor and conducted by 
the police complaint committee comprised of independent individuals working side-
by-side with the police is not satisfactory for the plaintive, he or she may turn to the 
ombudsman, who, with the exception of clearly unfounded complaints, is required to 
reinvestigate all complaints.1 In Australia, the ombudsmen and the complaint 
committees of the federal states work together with the committees of the police 
overseeing professional norms. 
 
The system of civilian oversight is in close relation to the structure of the police: the 
members of the complaint committees of Australia and the review boards of Canada, 
or the United States are comprised of citizens of the local community, and the 
credibility of their operation is secured by the trustworthiness of their members. 
  
A separate part of the civilian oversight of the police is the monitoring of police 
detention-facilities. The circular letter of the British Home Office of 1986 made 
possible the entrance of „lay visitors” to police detention-facilities in England. 
Although the system was adopted in only a few countries, a group of representatives 
in the General Assembly of the European Council brought forth a proposal in 1998, 
which recommends the establishment of civilian detention-facility monitoring 
programs for all member countries. 
 
In Hungary before the transition all political parties, in fact, the Ministry of Interior as 
well, thought that the local governments would play a vital role in the maintenance of 
public security and in the local supervision of the police responsible for public 
security. Yet, after its accession to office, the first freely elected government assumed 
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the position of maintaining a centralized police force. The only trace of the concept of 
local-governmental policing, was the fact that the local governments could veto the 
appointment of police-chiefs until 1994. The law on policing changed the veto-right to 
a complicated system of rendering account the police leadership. If the local 
government (or the majority of local governments in the area of jurisdiction) refuses to 
accept the report of the police commissioner, or police chief for the second time, than 
the superior of the police leader is required to conduct a comprehensive investigation, 
and to inspect the serviceability of the police chief (or commissioner) [Act XXXIV of 
1994, Art. 8, para 5.]. Therefore the right of investigation is not relinquished from the 
inner circle of the police, even in the case of exceptionally great local-governmental 
discontent. During the preparatory discussions of the six parties for the acceptance of 
the law on police, the police vehemently objected to all proposals, which would 
include representatives of the local governments in the investigative procedure 
designated by law. This closed attitude of the police, which rejected all exterior 
control was breached by the modification of 1995 to Act LIX of 1993 on the human 
rights commissioner of the General Assembly; the modification terminated the 
authorization of the national police commissioner to restrict the rights of the 
commissioner, elected with the qualified majority of the General Assembly, when 
reviewing police documents. It was in this legal environment, and with this tradition 
of the police in the background that Gàbor Kuncze, Interior Minister stated during the 
meeting of the General Assembly’s human rights committee, that he feels the NGO’s 
should observe the operation of the law enforcement agencies under the direction of 
the Interior Ministry, and should take a strong line in the protection of human rights. 
 
In 1995 three non-governmental organizations, the Hungarian Human Rights 
Protection Center (MEJOK), the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the Veritas 
Foundation received permission to conduct intensive monitoring for the duration of a 
week at the immigration hostel of the Kistarcsa Police Regiment.2 In 1996 the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee made a verbal, and in 1997 signed a written agreement 
of cooperation with the National Police Headquarters. Based upon the agreement the 
monitoring groups of the committee may enter, without any previous notification, 
police detention-facilities, or retaining areas and may, with security control, but 
without supervision, talk to the detained, and may with their permission view the 
documents concerning their detainment. Since the signing of the agreement the 
leadership of the National Police Headquarters has changed twice, in 1998 a new 
government was elected, yet the Detention-facility Monitoring Program is still 
currently undergoing, with basically the same rules. The experiences of the first year’s 
intensive monitoring work in 1996 were collected in the work entitled Punished 
Before Sentence.3 
 
The social organization APT (Association for the Prevention of Torture) in close 
cooperation with The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
published a book-length study on the different applied models of detention-facility 
monitoring in England and Wales, Northern Ireland, The Netherlands, South Africa 
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and Hungary. The Hungarian program - according to the author, Lene Johannessen 
Wendland - „provides a new and creative example of introducing the civilian 
oversight of the police in a country where there is no rich tradition of the social 
control of the police […] It is great luck that a strong local NGO organizes the 
monitoring with the contribution of professionally prepared monitors. The strong 
organizational ties created between the organization of the police and the external 
monitors in Great-Britain and the Netherlands would probably injure the authenticity 
of the monitoring in Hungary.” And finally: „The fact that the program has been going 
on for awhile is a sign that the political leadership of the police desires a more clearly 
comprehendible police, which has the chance of the society respecting it more.”4   
 
The international interest in the Hungarian Detention-facility Monitoring Program is 
indicated by the fact that the Hungarian Helsinki Committee received an invitation to 
the Strasbourg convention of the European Council’s program entitled Police and 
Human Rights 1997-2000 an delivered a report on the practice of detention-facility 
monitoring.5 The representative of the Ministry of Interior was present as an official 
participant of the program. 
 
The civilian oversight of the police is conducted, in those countries were there are 
such bodies in existence, by a competent agency - a public body appointed by the local 
or regional (self) government - of the state power comprised of independent 
individuals. To have an NGO, therefore an organization independent from the 
government and without any license of power, visit police detention-facilities is an 
exceptional and unique phenomenon. The activity of the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee can under no circumstances be called civilian oversight, since the practice 
of maintaining an oversight supposes a certain jurisdiction specified by law. The 
committee does not control or supervise but merely observe, identical to the right of 
the media and all citizens and to observe the operation of state agencies and formulate 
an opinion based upon his or her experiences. Naturally in order to observe the 
activity of law enforcement agencies - if not required by law that they tolerate this 
civilian oversight - it is necessary to obtain their permission to do so. The agreement 
between the National Police Headquarters and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee acts 
as a substitution of the civilian oversight not required by law, but which is 
increasingly indispensable in the process of European integration. We cannot decide 
today, whether the detention-facility monitoring conducted since 1996 is an 
intermediate solution, which was created in an opportune moment by the need for 
civilian oversight and by the lack of regulatory legislation or a trail-blazing endeavor 
which might prove to be a lasting innovation in the history of civilian oversight6. 
 
I was invited as a lecturer to the IACOLE’s conference in Sydney by the president of 
the organization, Marc Gissiner. It seemed obvious that I discuss the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee’s Detention-facility Monitoring Program, since the ombudsmen, 
judges and members of the complaint- and monitoring committees mainly from 
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Anglo-Saxon, southeastern Asian and Latin-American countries were interested 
within what framework, with what legal licenses, with what restrictions and finally 
with what effectiveness could an NGO monitoring police detention-facilities operate, 
especially in a post-communist country were there is no tradition of the civilian 
oversight of the police. The only argument against this choice of subject was that the 
report on the detention-facility monitoring had been published in English, furthermore 
I myself gave a lecture in 1998 on the legal problems concerning the program at the 
conference of the APT and the COLPI in Budapest.7 
 
Yet this was not what prompted me to speak about another subject. I found out that 
my lecture was scheduled in the section, which dealt with the political use of police. 
The political use of police is dealt with at the level of police governance; oversight 
independent from the governing power may hinder the police leadership’s abuse of 
their rights at the most. 
 
I was therefore honored the subject chosen by the organizers of the conference and I 
discussed the issue designated by the title of the work.  
 
 
Who is Using Whom? 
 
 
In parliamentary democracies, the civilian oversight of police – or more generally 
speaking, law enforcement bodies – is a multi-branch and multi-tier scheme, realized 
in the cooperation of participants from the central and local governments, the 
legislature, the judiciary, various independent groups monitoring compliance with 
international treaties, the public and non-governmental organizations. The concept of 
civilian oversight cannot be interpreted solely as the activity of civil society that does 
not possess public power. In parliamentary democracies, parliament and government 
function on the basis of the authorization vested in them by the voters, that is, the 
whole society. In other words, the governmental and parliamentary direction and 
control of the police is, after all, direction and control originating from society at 
large. In reality, however, the interests of the parties, ministries, law enforcement 
agencies, and of course economic interests distort this ideal model to such an extent 
that the representation of voters hardly comes through in the governmental and 
parliamentary direction and control of police. Therefore it is very important that 
ombudsmen and non-governmental organizations should oversee the functioning of 
law enforcement agencies – with special emphasis on the protection of fundamental 
civil rights – as well. The previous receive their mandate from parliament but operate 
independently of parliamentary parties and the government. The latter embody direct 
democracy within the system of representational democracy: they participate in the 
oversight of the police based on the premise that all members of society are authorized 
to do so, since the police is formed and maintained by all members of the society. 
 
The term „political use of police” usually evokes negative feelings, although in 
constitutional democracies it should be natural that since it is the government that 
defines a country’s policies (within constitutional limits, of course), the government is 
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authorized to realize its political goals in managing the institutions as well. This is 
usually manifested in introducing laws and adopting decrees, but also in the day-to-
day definition of tasks for the state organs. Based on the authorization of the voters, 
the government may appoint priorities for the police, such as what to consider more 
important within the fight against crime and the protection of public safety. For 
example, should the police prevent and investigate rarely occurring but shocking acts 
of terrorism, or should they instead concentrate on reducing the number of house 
burglaries, or perhaps even that the police itself should be more keen on exposing and 
punishing police officers who abuse their power? 
 
The political use of police in the above-described way is not a constitutional or 
professional question, but a political one. If public opinion, the majority of the citizens 
approve of the government’s crime and public safety policy, or if the government is 
able to convince the public that their course is right, it’s a good point for the 
government, if not, it’s a bad point for them. In this sense, the government’s police 
policy is under the strictest of civilian oversight, because if the public is very 
dissatisfied with the performance of the police, they government may lose in the next 
elections. Of course we all know that there are few things as effective in manipulating 
the public as creating fear of crime. This also has its limits, however. As much the 
public is irritated by crime, the power of an omniscient and omnipotent police will be 
equally irritating after a certain time.  
 
We talk about the political use of the police in a negative sense when a government – 
or a political group behind it – forces the police to execute the basic tasks of public 
safety maintenance and crime fighting primarily according to the interests and 
intentions of the ruling government or political clique. In this sense of the term it was 
possible for the police – or part of the police – to become a tool in overthrowing 
constitutional democracies and maintaining totalitarian dictatorships. This is what 
happened in Eastern and Central Europe after World War II: the communist party, 
striving for absolute power, endeavored to take control of the police everywhere, so 
that they could strike the groups in opposition with the tools of the police. 
 
The political misuse of police, however, does not take place only in the extreme 
environment of a developing or established dictatorship. It’s also a form of misuse 
when a constitutional government forces the police, or other law enforcement organs, 
to execute measures which the laws do not authorize them to do, or which are 
downright contrary to the laws.  
 
In the relationship between politics and police, the police are not solely a passive 
player, a victim of power abuse. The police take on an active role when – during the 
political tug-of-war – the police, or rather, its leadership, tries to make sure that its 
own organizational and financial needs are met. In some cases this effort may be so 
successful that in the end it’s hard to tell if it’s government misusing the police, or the 
other way round. 
 
Let me now tell you a few examples for the above, from the history and practice of the 
Hungarian Police – since, naturally, I understand Hungarian state of affairs the best. 
These Hungarian examples are not special in any way, moreover, they demonstrate 
correlations and tendencies which can be observed everywhere around the world. 
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Therefore, these examples are able to demonstrate how a totalitarian system interprets 
the function of the police, how a government is able to misuse its power even in a 
constitutional democracy, and how the rightful battle of police, resisting the 
subjugation to politics, transforms into a struggle aimed at getting rid of all external 
control while conquering a larger and larger sphere of life. 
 
Part 1: The Fist of the Party and the Police’s War of Independence 
 
„The police is a branch of public order management whose procedures should be 
defined not by progressive notions, but by the needs and requirements of good public 
order management – except for the requirement of more democratic case handling.”8  
 
These words were written in 1945 by Istvan Bibo, the famous Hungarian political 
thinker, who was Minister of Interior during the 1956 Revolution. According to the 
theory of the Communist Party at that time, the police was a tool in the hands of the 
given ruling class. The democratic police take part in the revolutionary fight for 
people’s democracy as the people’s police. In this context, the people’s democracy 
was the period preceding the total communist take-over, a time when the parliament 
and political parties could still function, but their political space was increasingly 
limited by the Communist Party and the invading Soviet military power behind it. In 
the framework of „taking part in the revolutionary fight”, the police – or rather its so-
called „state defense department” – commanded and controlled by the Communist 
Ministry of Interior, arrested everyone opposing the extension of communist rule, 
under suspicion of „war crimes” or „high treason”. Istvan Bibo was attempting to 
condemn this practice in his controversial essay titled „The Crisis of Hungarian 
Democracy”, calling attention to the dangers inherent in using the police as a 
„progressive”, revolutionary force. 
 
After the communist take-over – officially after January 1, 1950 – the function of 
direct political oppression was transferred to an organ that was even formally separate 
from the police itself: the State Defense Authority. This agency was actually 
commanded by the leader of the Communist Party, and which not only had a whole 
system of detectives and informers, but also its own armed forces. From then on the 
role of the police became secondary to the state defense authorities, although naturally 
the police, like all other organizations of public life was overseen by the Communist 
Party, in accordance with the basic principles of a communist state. Pushing the police 
to the background contributed to the fact that during the 1956 Revolution the police 
remained „neutral”, moreover, the police chief of Budapest prohibited the use of 
weapons against those taking part in the uprising. 
 
Following the stifling of the revolution, the political leadership „hid” the hated state 
defense organization behind the facade of the police. Even though the leadership and 
organization of the state defense apparatus was still separate from the Police within 
the Ministry of Interior, for outsiders, the state defense officers were simply police 
officers. In the 80’s the interrogation of the members of the political opposition, the 
„dissidents” was carried out in police buildings. In many cases the doorman often did 
not even know where the summoned needed to be directed, because the state defense 
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detective himself was a guest in the building. The armed forces of the state defense 
authority were ceased in the beginning of the 60’s: the peaceful political 
demonstrations preceding the fall of communism in 1989-90 were beaten down by the 
police, at the order of the communist party. 
 
It is therefore understandable that on the threshold of change one of the first demands 
of the democratic opposition was to separate the state defense organization from the 
police and from the Ministry of Interior, so it may become visible – even if not 
transparent.  
 
This what the leaders of the police wanted too, because they had had enough of the 
arrogance of state defense officers who earned much more money than them. But the 
police also wanted to get out of the system in which the first man of the police 
reported directly to the Minister of Interior, who in turn was nothing more than a 
servant to those principles and commands which were issued by the central bodies of 
the communist party. 
 
The battle of the police against the domination of politics was a contradictory process. 
On the one hand it was the police’s war of independence against the Party, while on 
the other hand it entailed the intention of the police to get rid of all sorts of external 
control, be it governmental or other. The latter effort had direct political reasons. The 
reform communists in the Ministry of Interior, who worked out the legislative changes 
related to the transition, wanted to „save” the police – 90% of whom were Party 
members – from subordination to a non-communist Minister of Interior in the future 
first freely elected government. As a result, in March 1990, a month before the 
elections, one of the last laws passed by the Communist Parliament (Act XXII of 
1990) deprived the Minister of Interior from giving any orders to the police or to the 
national chief commissioner of the police. This limitation, which was in effect until 
1994, when the new law on police was passed, did not mean that the government and 
its Minister of Interior instructed the police solely by way of laws. Rather, it meant 
that civilian and governmental oversight was practiced in an informal manner – that 
is, over the phone. Whether the police – the national chief commissioner – obeyed 
these informal orders or not depended on the person of the Minister, on the nature of 
the order, and on what was offered in exchange for the „loyalty.” 
 
The police’s war of independence against the direct subjugation to the state party was 
waged in the 18-month period preceding the first free elections. The decade before the 
transition, the „liberal” epoch of the communist party’s absolutism, which the world 
press referred to as „goulash communism”, was characterized by another type of 
independence effort. As the power of the state defense authority was withering away, 
the strength of the police began to increase. For example, as more and more people 
were permitted to travel abroad, as the circulation of more and more „illegal” (i.e. 
uncensored) publications had to be tolerated (despite continuous harassment from the 
state security organs), the police’s permitted field of action in public safety grew 
larger and larger. These new powers primarily inflicted the poorest groups in society 
(above all the Roma minority) and not the political opposition. The time period of 
police supervision was raised to 3 years, the maximum time of police detention 
without court decision, to be used for minor offenses, was increased from 30 days to 
60. When large-scale unemployment became prevalent, the institution of „severe 
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correctional-education work” was introduced: those without income could be 
sentenced to prison by court and to (forced) labor at a designated employee. A 1984 
government decree authorized policemen to search anyone’s car, packages, and 
clothing and to interrogate him / her without any special authorization and suspicion 
of crime during an „identity check”. A few of these licenses, for example police 
detention and severe correctional-education work, were abolished during the 
transition, when basic norms of democracy were incorporated into the Constitution. 
Other powers, however, such as the regulations regarding „identity checks” survived 
the transition. The governmental decree issued in 1984 was included in the Law on 
Police ten years afterwards, a bill which was accepted by Parliament’s qualified 
majority. Based on this law, the Hungarian police carries out about 1,200,000 identity 
checks annually, searches the trunks of cars and empties the pockets of people on a 
regular basis. This is how military authorities proceed in an invaded country. 
 
Public order versus legal order  
 
The communist state never had to explain anything. No one was allowed to publicly 
object police actions based on political decisions. (And even if they did, it was really 
easy to adjust the law to justify the authoritarian practice.) 
 
A government under the rule of law, however, must explain measures that are not 
properly supported by laws. The second, quite autocratic Minister of Interior of the 
first freely elected government declared the following on March 25, 1992: „Many 
people debate whether this or that has a legal basis or not. We don’t have time to get 
into this. What we are doing is protection of the nation.9” This announcement was 
spurred by a new government measure which, in lack of an immigration law and citing 
an old decree passed by the party-state, authorized the border guards to refuse entry to 
foreigners who had proper travel documents but were not able to show evidence of 
„sufficient funds” to finance their stay in Hungary. As the Minister himself said, based 
on this measure 2,500-3,000 people were turned back from the Hungarian-Romanian 
border each day. Since it was never defined what „sufficient funds” meant, autocracy, 
corruption and discrimination reigned at the border. Especially Gypsies and Africans 
as well as other colored people wishing to come in via Romania were turned back. 
Illegal Romanian workers, who are able to enter Hungary without a visa for 30 days 
and therefore must leave the country and re-enter again and again, were often only let 
in for a hefty „fee”. In the meantime, public safety had not improved a bit, and neither 
illegal foreign labor, nor the smuggling of goods across the border disappeared. The 
measure was only good for one thing: to suggest a correlation between rising crime 
rates and foreigners, especially ones from eastern countries. But let’s forget about 
whether the measure was successful or not. The danger is actually in the philosophy 
explaining the measure: that laws can be superseded by the interest of the nation, 
which, in turn, is defined by the government. Public order is more important than 
legality. 
 
The past year produced another example of the authoritarian tightening of immigration 
laws, this time not without authorization but in contradiction of current laws. The 
national chief commissioner of the police and the national commander of the border 
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guards issued a joint order in August 1998 prohibiting illegal immigrants – mostly 
Kosovars or Afghans asylum seekers, Bangladeshi and Pakistani economic migrants – 
to leave the so-called „community shelters” where they must stay. The law, however, 
clearly states that assigning a compulsory place of stay does not qualify as detention, 
and illegal aliens’ freedom of movement in Hungary may only be restricted as much 
as the immigration procedures require (Act LXXXVI of 1993 Art 43, para 1 and 
government order 64 of 1994, Art 54). This time the measure was introduced in the 
framework of the campaign against organized crime, although civil war and economic 
refugees are victims, rather than actors of organized crime – namely, human 
trafficking. The border guards officers who executed the measure were generally 
aware of this. However, when questioned by civilians, they answered the same way as 
war criminals after World War II: I am a soldier, I have to carry out my orders.  
 
The most obvious case for political misuse of police is when the government orders 
the police to commit illegal actions for plain party interests, and not even for real or 
imagined public interest. In the fall of 1992 the political battle escalated between 
several platforms within the Parliament. On the one had, the governing conservative 
parties and the liberal opposition engaged in a more and more bitter fight. On the other 
hand, two cliques within the coalition’s leading party, the one headed by the 
moderately conservative Prime Minister, and the other, an ultra-right wing group 
calling themselves „national radicals” had more and more conflicts. The ultra-right 
wing group concentrated their attacks on the state-run television, which they 
condemned as „too liberal”. The leader of the radicals declared: he wants to see the 
managers of the TV led out of the building by the police. The party was preparing for 
the national convention where it was to be decided whether the Prime Minister or the 
leader of the radicals will be the first man of the right wing. As the situation got out of 
hand, the Minister of Justice filed a report against two of the TV station managers on 
suspicion of financial corruption. The Minister of Interior summoned the national 
chief commissioner of the police and the head of the national investigating unit to the 
Parliament. He ordered them to immediately start investigating the case. A young 
police detective, who had previous experience dealing with complicated financial 
crimes, was assigned to the case. However, he soon indicated that the data contained 
in the complaint was insufficient for initiating a criminal procedure or carrying out a 
house search. According to Art. 126 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a supplementary 
complaint must be filed. Based on the new information, the investigating authority 
will then decide whether or not the criminal procedure will be started. Contrary to 
him, the head of the police investigating unit regarded the words of the Minister as a 
command. He did not consider the professional arguments, and maintained his order: 
the officer must escort the TV managers out of the building and search their 
apartment. The officer did not refuse the order, since by doing so he would have 
committed a military offense. Immediately after the house search, however, he asked 
to be discharged. The investigation continued for several months. Close to 800 
employees of the TV were called in as witness, but in the end the public prosecutors 
refused to bring charges for lack of evidence. The young police officer was transferred 
to the Finance and Customs Police, and the radical leader left the coalition and formed 
his own party – otherwise everyone remained in their place. The governing party, 
however, suffered a severe defeat in the next parliamentary elections.  
 
Part 2: The Police’s War of Independence 
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Prior to the 1990 elections, the leadership of the police denounced its former activities 
during the communist state. „Our police had a wrong concept regarding its function 
right up till recent times,” said Andras Turos, national chief commissioner of the 
police, and – at that time – ex officio deputy to the Minister of Interior. „We thought 
that our basic role was to protect socialist society”. In the meantime, the self-criticism 
continued and the real vocation of the police, apprehending criminals, had lost its 
proper emphasis. went on the self-criticism.10 (Magyar Nemzet, February 1990.) 
 
Parallel to the self critique, the police started, or rather accelerated its struggle for 
independence, asking for more money out of the state budget, and trying to regain its 
licenses which had been lost during the transition to democracy. The police supported 
both of these demands by citing rising crime rates, the deterioration of public safety. 
(It is true that the number of reported crimes drastically rose in 1989, and has been 
rising ever since. Nevertheless, the number of crimes per 100,000 people still does not 
exceed the Western European average.) Police propaganda continues to explain the 
deterioration of public safety with the argument that due to political transition (i.e. 
democracy), poorly equipped and underpaid police officers became uncertain as to 
their tasks.  
 
Thanks to its tireless efforts, the police have become one of the most powerful lobbies 
amongst the state institutions. Since 1990, all governments (regardless of party 
inclinations) have designated the improvement of public safety as their first priority. 
Therefore, the size of the police and their budget has been steadily increasing. The 
permanent professional staff of the police went from twenty thousand (in 1989) to 
thirty-two thousand five hundred. This means that there is one policeman for every 
330 citizens. This number does not include the twelve thousand border guards, a 
separate corps serving police functions in the border zone. According to the Law on 
Police, the Minister of Interior „represents the police during sessions of the Parliament 
and the government.” (Act XXXIV of 1994 Art. 4, para 3 a.) Ministers – as members 
of the government – control the organizations supervised by the government. But a 
Defense Minister commands, and does not represent the army, likewise, a Finance 
Minister regulates but does not represent the Tax Authorities. It is only the Law on 
Police that transfers representational obligation or right to a member of the 
government. What this implies is that the police, a state organ, has certain sovereignty 
against the state and the main bodies of state power. In such state of affairs the 
question can be posed: is it politics using the police, or is the police using politics? 
 
Before the transition, it seemed obvious that in a future democracy police officers 
would be civil servants and not soldiers. As a first step, the first Minister of Interior of 
the freely elected government ordered the de-militarization of policemen performing 
duties of civil servants in the Ministry. The Independent Trade Union of Policemen 
objected this decision, because military status of police officers entailed a number of 
advantages: lower retirement age, rank entitlements, fully paid sick leave, etc. 
Policemen would have lost all of these benefits had they been converted into civil 
servants. The Trade Union brought the case to court and won. This was the first 
example when the police managed to protect its own interests against those of the 
                                                          
10
 A round-table discussion organized by the Magyar Nemzet. Quote from Ottíilia Solt: Dignity for 
Everyone volumes I-II. An edition of the Beszél, 1998, II. volume, p. 401. 
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state administration. Another interesting point in the failure of „civilizing” the police 
was when the first national chief commissioner of the police, who had no past with the 
police but enjoyed the support of the Minister, had to leave his post within half a year. 
His successor was again a police officer.  
 
The second Minister of Interior of the transition abandoned the reform efforts of his 
predecessor. Instead, he tried to secure the loyalty of the police – or rather, the 
leadership of the police – with personal politics.  
 
In Hungary there was no cleansing within the staff of the police following the 
transition. (Even at the state defense authority, cleansing was only partial.) Although 
180 higher ranking police officers voluntarily left the corps prior to the elections, 
policemen who beat down demonstrations, harassed the opposition, and directed 
assaults against Gypsy settlements stayed in their jobs and no one questioned them. 
Based on a legal authorization, the new government intended to filter the police by 
introducing an application system. The county and town police chief positions had to 
be filled by inviting applications even if the positions were already filled. As another 
filter in the system, the local government had the right to veto the appointment of a 
city police captain. This right, however, did not apply to the appointment of county 
police chiefs, who had much more decision-making power.  
 
The new Minister of Interior, stepping into office in January 1991, interpreted this 
provision of the law in a particular manner. According to him, the law did not 
prescribe that the post must be given to the person whose application materials were 
judged to be the best by the professional board. Filing the application is sufficient for 
winning the appointment. Thus the minister often chose to appoint applicants who 
were only ranked third, fourth, or even last by the professional board. „I am following 
Napoleon’s principle,” said the Minister in the hallway of the Parliament. „I select my 
generals from the less qualified positions. That way, they will never forget whom to 
be thankful for their glory.” 
 
The Law on Police, passed in 1994, liberated the police from both of its main curses: 
the application system and the local government’s right to veto. Ever since then, the 
career, honor or discharge of a police officer has depended on no one else but his 
supervisors, in essence, the national chief commissioner of the police, whose fate is in 
the hands of the government and the Ministry of Interior. 
 
In exchange for total subjugation to the government, the police was permitted to keep 
and to regain its licenses, to widen its scope of activities, and – as a consequence of 
the latter – to increase its lobbying power. The police’s drive for power coincided with 
the etatist government philosophy, regardless of whether the government was a 
conservative or socialist one. The police was just as effectively lobbying between 
1994 and 1998, when the Minister of Interior was a leader of a liberal party, the 
coalition partner of the Socialists.  
 
During the liberal leadership of the Ministry of Interior, the government introduced a 
law about the service relations of persons employed by the armed forces, that is, 
soldiers, border guards, police officers, customs and prison guards, firemen and 
members of the national security service. This law, contrary to the recommendations 
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of the Council of Europe, declares that a policeman is a soldier, who must fulfill even 
illegal orders, otherwise he /she may be prosecuted [Act XLIII of 1996 Art. 68, para 
2]. The trade unions of law enforcement bodies played a significant role in preparing 
the law. As a result of their pressure, military status entails such benefits that changing 
the law or trying the „civilize” the police force would not be possible without getting 
into a painful conflict with the police.  
 
The law enforcement lobby managed to obtain many other of its goals, despite – or 
rather, behind the back of – the liberal Interior Ministry leadership. In 1996, as part of 
a law about economic policy, the task of issuing identity cards was again assigned to 
the police, even though according to a previous law this task should have been taken 
over by local public administration. In 1995, the police, interpreting a new Service 
Regulation issued by the Minister of Interior, authorized itself to conduct large scale 
raids spanning huge territories, even the whole country. Thousands of pedestrians and 
vehicles may be stopped and checked during these raids. (Most major, well-publicized 
crimes were followed by such raids, usually without any result.) In the guise of an 
MP’s modification motion, the Ministry of Interior managed to add a paragraph to the 
Law on Asylum, making it possible for the immigration authorities – that is, the police 
and the border guards – to play a decisive role in refugee affairs as well [Act CXXXIX 
of 1997 Art 30, para 2]. Citing this as an increase in tasks, the border guards asked for 
and received a significant budget supplementation, while the budget of the 
corresponding civilian organization, the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, was 
decreased.  
 
In the meantime, the police disregarded all budgetary constraints, kept getting into 
debt, and kept forcing the government to pay its debts.  
 
The new catch phrase: Fight against organized crime 
 
In the recent past, the power of the police grew to supersede the power of society in 
new dimensions. In the name of – or rather, under the pretext of – fighting organized 
crime, the police obtained the right to temporarily (even for a year!) close down any 
business whose manager or employee is prosecuted for any of thirteen crimes, if 
suspected to be committed in the context of operating the business [Act LXXXIV of 
199, Art 5, para 1 and 2]. Closing down the business has to be ordered by the public 
notary of the local municipal government at the recommendation of the police. The 
maximum period of temporarily closing down is one year, which is plenty of time for 
a business to go completely bankrupt. The action of the public notary does not have to 
be supported by a legally binding court decision, not even by an indictment, it is 
sufficient ground if the police starts a criminal procedure. The crimes listed in the law 
vary in type and in severity: some of them are aggressive crimes (self-arbitration, 
robbery, blackmail), which truly warrant immediate action, while others include 
aiding prostitution and drug abuse. It is no secret that this law (which took effect on 
September 1, 1999) is openly against drug use and clubs where drugs are used. 
Because the law qualifies the use of soft drugs in small quantities as a crime, the 
police is authorized to close down any club if some of its guests are found to smoke 
marijuana, or if any of the guests arbitrarily taken in for interrogation and urine-testing 
are found to have consumed any type of „disco drug”. 
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Although it is the public notary who decides to close down the business, there is 
hardly any notary who would disregard a recommendation from the police. At the 
same time, the police only notify the notary about the initiation of a criminal 
procedure, or the final conclusion thereof, if they deem it necessary. If the offender is 
convicted at the final instance, the notary’s discretion to order the business to be 
closed down ceases, that is, he must close down the business. However, if the police 
do not find it necessary to notify the notary about the conviction, the business may go 
on operating despite a final convicting court decision [Art 5, para 3].  
 
Originally, the bill that was introduced to Parliament offered the alternative of a fine 
instead of closing down the business. This penalty would have been anywhere from 
five hundred thousand to one million forints (ten-twenty times the average monthly 
Hungarian wages) to be paid by the manager of the business. Although this provision 
was left out of the final version of the law that was passed, it would be hard to believe 
that the police simply let go of the revenue that this fine would have meant. This is 
underscored by the fact that the law authorizes the government to regulate the use of 
funds that are collected from fines.  
 
The law requires tax authorities, financial institutions, the stock exchange, insurance 
companies, telecommunication companies and health care institutions to disclose any 
data handled by them if the investigative authorities approach them with a „urgent” 
request – even if there’s no prior approval from a prosecutor yet for the action [Art 47-
57]. If the prosecutor denies approval of the action „after the fact”, the data must be 
destroyed – however, in terms of the law, neither the data provider, nor the person 
concerned needs to be notified. In fact, they should not be notified, because any 
information that was obtained during a criminal investigation, but which is not part of 
a criminal procedure, is classified as a state secret. 
 
The law against organized crime also regulates the issue of prostitution [Art 7-12]. 
Nowadays, most states try to push prostitution out of public spaces, realizing that it is 
not possible to eradicate this phenomenon altogether. According to the new Hungarian 
regulation, however, any bar where a prostitute works can be closed down because of 
aiding prostitution, any newspaper where a prostitute advertises herself can be fined, 
and the manager of a brothel can be sentenced to maximum 5 years of prison. In other 
words, the prostitutes are „left out on the streets”, in public space, or in the designated 
„tolerated zones” of public space. The prostitute may freely carry on her activities 
here, but police can always stop and check her, and may even fine her if she does not 
have the prescribed medical documents or if her solicitation is too pushy. Again, the 
lords of the street and of the tolerated zones are the police. 
 
 
Covert information-gathering - status symbols of law enforcement agencies 
 
Before the transition the agencies of national security enjoyed priority over the use of 
secret-service instruments. The tapping of telephone lines and the opening of letters 
were the privileges of the national security agencies; they only shared their 
information with the police when they wished to do so. After the transition the 
police’s share of the utilization of secret-service instruments continuously grew - and 
this is in order. In the meantime, however, a competition of prestige started amongst 
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the law enforcement agencies, with all of the agencies hoping to establish an 
independent authority of investigation and reconnaissance, a part of this being the 
authorization to use secret-service methods. 
 
According to public opinion, the methods tied to judicial permission - covert house 
searching, opening of letters, and the tapping of telephone lines above all - are the 
most serious encroachments on privacy. In reality, before 1990 and probably today as 
well, common people cooperating with law enforcement agencies provided and 
continue to provide most information to crime-fighting authorities. No external 
permission is need for this type of information gathering. Law enforcement agencies 
do not only utilize covert methods when searching after perpetrators of crimes but as a 
preventive measure against crimes. This means that they may secretly gather 
information on anyone and store this information for two years - without any real 
control - even if no criminal prosecution is initiated concerning this individual. 
 
Nowadays the police, the four national security agencies, the border guards, the 
custom guards the revenue police and the so-called preventive service controlling the 
law enforcement agencies are all authorized to use covert information gathering not 
tied to judicial permission. Since these organizations conceal information from each 
other - although the law requires them to cooperate with each other - no one knows on 
how many individuals and for how many reasons various organizations are gathering 
information and how often one organization is searching after an undercover agent of 
another organization. Some of the secret-service scandals - the observation of the 
Baranya-county minority self-governments, the case of the ecological studies 
conducted for private reasons and primarily the Nyirfa-case - indicated that secret files 
contain a great amount of partly widely known, partly rumor-like data. 
 
Secret information gathering is governed by an increasing number of regulations - as 
opposed to the pre-transition era - although no one may control the observance of 
these regulations. Despite the great amount of legislation there still exist branches of 
secret-service agencies, which operate in an unregulated, in fact, unlawful manner. 
Validly convicted individuals may only be interrogated by a police officer in the 
course of a new procedure. Despite this fact the police maintain an operative network 
inside the penitentiaries; the police officers operating under the investigative 
departments of the county police headquarters regularly summon the convicts and 
interrogate, recruit and with the consent of the penitentiaries, reward or punish them. 
 
The law on organized crime clearly defines a role for the operative network of the 
penitentiaries. According to Art. 13-14 the preventive inspection of crimes is initiated 
by the police headquarters overseeing the residence of the penitentiary if the convict 
„displays evidence during the time of conviction of maintaining the lifestyle of a 
criminal or renews his criminal ties we may soundly conclude that he will commit 
another crime”. From what other source of information may the county police 
headquarters know of the renewing of the criminal ties of the convict if not from the 
operative officer or network working inside the penitentiary? The only question is, 
how will the judge imposing the punishment justify the ruling of criminal prevention, 
since the information serving as the basis of the ruling is a state secret.          
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Ten years ago the political transition started with the separation of the Ministry of 
Interior, representing governmental supervision, from the police, the authority 
enforcing laws. Now this process has taken an opposite direction. The Ministry of 
Interior acts as an authority in public administrative matters, its decisions may be 
appealed to the Minister himself, a politician [Act LXXXVI of 1993 Art 48 modified 
para 2]. These days, mostly former policemen manage the Ministry of Interior. The 
Minister himself is a lieutenant general; he used to be the national chief commissioner 
of the police. The chief of the Minister’s cabinet is a major general, the state secretary 
for public administration is a brigadier, and department heads are colonels, lieutenant 
colonels. Of course, their service relationship is suspended, that is, their employment 
status is that of a civil servant, and they oversee the police as civilian government 
officials.  
 
But do they also exercise civilian oversight over the policeman inside themselves? 
 
